

## **Achieving the aims of the Cartagena Action Plan: The Geneva Progress Report 2011-2012**

### **Introduction**

1. From 30 November to 4 December 2009, the international community gathered at a high level in Cartagena, Colombia to reaffirm the commitment of States, international organisations and civil society to ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines and to achieving a world free of mines. At this historic event – the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World – the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, while inspired by their collective achievements, expressed their will to strengthen their efforts to overcome remaining challenges.
2. With the aim of supporting enhanced implementation and promotion of the Convention in the five year period following the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 and pledged to translate this action plan into sustainable progress while acknowledging their respective local, national and regional circumstances with regard to its practical implementation.
3. To ensure the effectiveness of the Cartagena Action Plan, the States Parties appreciate the need to regularly monitor progress of the application of the actions contained within it. The purpose of the Geneva Progress Report 2011-2012 is to support the application of the Cartagena Action Plan by measuring progress made during the period 2 December 2011 to 7 December 2012 and, in doing so, to highlight priority areas of work for the States Parties in the period between the 2012 Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties (12MSP) and the 2013 Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties (13MSP). It is the third in a series of annual progress reports prepared by the States Parties in advance of the 2014 Third Review Conference.

### **I. Universalisation**

4. Since the 2011 Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP), **Finland** on 9 January 2012, deposited its instrument of accession as did **Somalia** on 16 April 2012. There are now 160 States that have ratified, acceded or succeeded to the Convention. Two (2) of the Convention's 133 signatories have not yet ratified, accepted or approved the Convention: the **Marshall Islands** and **Poland**, notwithstanding that, in accordance with Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these signatories are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.
5. Given their resolve to achieve universal adherence to the Convention and its norms, the States Parties agreed at the Cartagena Summit to seize every opportunity to promote ratification of and accession to the Convention, particularly in regions with low adherence to the Convention and to promote and encourage adherence to the norms of the Convention.<sup>1</sup> In light of the universalisation challenges noted in Cartagena and commitments made to overcome these challenges, His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Al-Hussein of Jordan continued to serve as a Special Envoy for the Convention. In 2012, Prince Mired continued to promote the universalisation of the Convention by travelling to **Libya** as part of a delegation headed by Jordan's Prime Minister as well as engaging **Kazakhstan** and **Sri Lanka** regarding the possibility of high level visits.

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<sup>1</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #1 and #3.

6. The 11MSP President continued efforts to promote the universalisation of the Convention, focusing particularly on South East Asia. In follow-up to his 2011 engagement of leaders from Singapore and Vietnam, the 11MSP President met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of **Myanmar** on 11 July 2012 in Phnom Penh. At this meeting, Myanmar's Minister of Foreign Affairs said that his government is seriously considering all key disarmament treaties, including the Convention, as part of its state reforms, and was optimistic that his government would positively consider the treaty.
7. Other States Parties continued their efforts to promote acceptance of the Convention, including through Belgium's ongoing efforts as Coordinator of the informal Universalisation Contact Group.
8. The States Parties continued to use the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the universalisation and implementation of the Convention as one measure of States' acceptance of the Convention's norms.<sup>2</sup> On 2 December 2011, this resolution was adopted by 162 votes to none, with 18 abstentions. The following 19 States not parties voted in favour of this resolution: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>3</sup> It was noted that, whereas in 2010 **Saudi Arabia** had for the first time voted in favour of this resolution, in 2011 Saudi Arabia abstained.
9. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to encourage and support the universalisation efforts of all relevant partners, including international, regional and non-governmental organizations.<sup>4</sup> The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its member organisations continued to promote acceptance of the Convention by States not parties, including in the Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Oman, Poland and the United States of America. In addition, the ICBL, in collaboration with the Colombian organisation Fundación Arcángeles and the United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT), led the "Lend Your Leg" campaign which saw thousands of ordinary people join with celebrities, including the United Nations Secretary General, in making the symbolic gesture of rolling up a pant leg or shirt sleeve to express their determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel landmines.
10. The 11MSP, in noting the value of engagement by States not parties at all levels, including at a high level, requested that the Convention's depository, the United Nations Secretary General, write to each State not party to the Convention to strongly encourage these States to ratify or accede to the Convention. On 29 February 2012, the 11MSP President wrote to the United Nations Secretary General to transmit this request, noting that the Secretary-General's pre-eminent role in promoting peace and security, strengthening international law and serving as the Convention's depository makes the Secretary-General well-placed to advance the cause of universalisation.
11. On 4 April 2012, the President of the European Parliament issued a statement calling upon Poland, the last remaining EU Member State which has not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention, to make good on its pledge to join the Convention during 2012. On the same day, the EU Presidency made a declaration appealing to States which have not yet acceded to the Convention to do so as soon as possible.

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/29.

<sup>3</sup> Finland is included in this list because the vote was taken prior to Finland acceding to the Convention.

<sup>4</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #2.

12. On 5 June 2012, the 42<sup>nd</sup> General Assembly of the Organisation of American States adopted a resolution to urge states which have not yet done so to ratify or consider acceding to the Convention as soon as possible to ensure its full and effective implementation.
13. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to condemn and continue to discourage in every possible way any production, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines by any actor.<sup>5</sup> Since the 11MSP, Syria made new use of anti-personnel mines. Several States Parties joined the 11MSP President, the ICBL and others in expressing deep concern and in calling for Syria to cease the use of anti-personnel mines.
14. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to encourage States not parties, particularly those that have professed support for the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, to participate in the work of the Convention.<sup>6</sup> In 2012, in keeping with the States Parties' tradition of openness, all States not parties were invited to participate in the Intersessional Work Programme and the 12MSP and its preparations. Ten (10) States that had not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention registered to take part in the May 2012 Intersessional Work Programme and [INSERT NUMBER] States not parties attended the 12MSP as observers.
15. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to continue promoting universal observance of the Conventions' norms by condemning and taking appropriate steps to end the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines by armed non-State actors.<sup>7</sup> Since the 11MSP, one additional armed non-State actor signed the Geneva Call's "Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action", and 42 armed non-State actors have now made this commitment. Nevertheless, the view was expressed that when engagement by non-governmental organizations of armed non-State actors is considered, vigilance is required to prevent terrorist organizations from exploiting the Ottawa Process for their own goals. Some States Parties continue to be of the view that when engagement with armed non-state actors is contemplated, States Parties concerned should be informed and their consent would be necessary in order for such an engagement to take place. One State Party reiterated its concern regarding the engagement on the basis of one previous signing of the "Deed of Commitment" of Geneva Call as inconsistent with the above view.

## **II. Stockpile destruction**

16. At the close of the 11MSP there were three (3) States Parties for which the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained relevant: Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine. In addition, South Sudan, with a deadline for the destruction of stockpiled mines in 2015, informed the 11MSP that it had discovered previously unknown stocks of anti-personnel mines. At the close of the 11MSP, 154 States Parties no longer held stocks of anti-personnel mines other than mines that States Parties are permitted to retain under Article 3, either because they never held stocks or because they had completed their destruction programmes. As of 2 December 2011, together the States Parties had reported the destruction of over 44.5 million AP mines.
17. Since the 11MSP, Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine continued their efforts to ensure the destruction of their stockpiles. All three of these States Parties have been non-compliant with respect to their Article 4 stockpile destruction obligation, since 2008, 2008 and 2010 respectively. In

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<sup>5</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #5.

<sup>6</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #6.

<sup>7</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #4.

addition since the 11MSP, the Convention entered into force for Finland, a State which previously had indicated it would need to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines, and for Somalia, a State which has not yet provided an indication regarding stockpiled anti-personnel mines. As well, since the 11MSP, no additional information was provided by South Sudan regarding the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Hence, there are 5 States Parties for which the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remains relevant and there are 154 States Parties which now no longer hold stocks of anti-personnel mines. Of these, two States Parties which are presumed not to hold stocks – Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu – have not yet officially confirmed this by submitting initial transparency information as required in accordance with Article 7.<sup>8</sup> Equatorial Guinea, is more than 12 years overdue in providing such information.

18. The 11MSP's Phnom Penh Progress Report again acknowledged that the complexity of destruction of PFM1-type anti-personnel mines combined with the limited number of entities capable of destroying these mines, the vast numbers of these mines held by Belarus and Ukraine, the inadvisability of transferring these mines for destruction and the high cost of destruction had resulted in a compelling implementation challenge for both States Parties. The Phnom Penh Progress Report also recalled that the destruction of PFM mines is significantly more challenging and complex, technically and financially, than the destruction of other anti-personnel mines.
19. The Phnom Penh Progress Report recorded that at the close of the 11MSP, **Belarus** had 3,356,636 stockpiled PFM-1 type anti-personnel mines that remained to be destroyed. As of 21 May 2012 Belarus possessed the same number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed.
20. On 21 May 2012, Belarus informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that it was continuing to work with the Spanish Company EXPAL, which is acting as the contractor for the EU-funded project "Destruction of PFM-1 series ammunition in Belarus." Belarus indicated that EXPAL has received residential status in Belarus and has been granted the necessary licenses to operate with explosives. Belarus further indicated that work on a destruction facility was continuing at an ammunition base near Rechitsa in south-east Belarus. Belarus noted that this process was more complicated and time consuming than EXPAL had originally predicted, with numerous pieces of equipment needing to be delivered to the destruction site from Spain and Germany, and with the transfer of explosives, detonators and detonation cords requiring special licenses, permits and user certificates in order to comply with international export control practices. In addition, unfavourable weather conditions during the winter delayed construction and gas, electricity and water supply maintenance at the site required that additional time be taken. Belarus further noted that its licensing authorities issued all required licenses and permits on time and that all imported items were cleared by Belarus' custom authorities without custom duties.
21. Belarus further informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that to effectively solve all pending issues pertaining to stockpile destruction, the Government of Belarus and the European Commission (EC) established, in February 2012, the "Coordinating Committee", which met three times in 2012 to address issues related to legislation, licensing, construction documents, permits, industrial certification procedures, customs clearance, visa issues, environmental expertise, and waste treatment. Belarus indicated that the Coordinating Committee has been helpful in addressing issues that have delayed the destruction of stockpiled mines.

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<sup>8</sup> Tuvalu's initial submission under Article 7 is due by 28 August 2012.

22. In terms of the construction of the destruction facility, Belarus informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that the manufacturing house and the detonation chamber have been installed, that it was expected that the contractor would receive the necessary permits and finalise the construction documentation within two months (i.e., by mid-July), and that by mid-June the off-gas treatment machine was expected to arrive to the destruction site. Belarus indicated that before destruction proceeds, the Contractor will complete an environmental impact assessment to be implemented by an agency authorised in conformity with Belarus' legislation, with this taking approximately one month. Belarus further indicated that upon the completion of the environmental impact assessment, the assessment report would be presented for a public hearing for an additional one month's time. Belarus emphasised that both the Government and EXPAL are dedicated to ensuring that the treatment of hazardous liquid and gaseous waste during the destruction process be conducted in an environmentally friendly manner and that Belarus' armed forces would bear full responsibility in promoting the safety and security of the destruction site.
23. Belarus further indicated that the destruction of all stockpiles in accordance with Article 4 would be complete in 2013.
24. The Phnom Penh Progress Report recorded that, at the close of the 11MSP, **Greece** had 953,285 stockpiled anti-personnel mines that remained to be destroyed. On 21 May 2012, Greece informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that, since the 11MSP, there has been no further progress in the destruction of the remaining stockpiled mines, pending a court decision pertaining to the legal dispute between Greece and Hellenic Defence Systems (EAS). Greece recalled (a) that on 16 June 2010, following a ministerial decision and an arbitral award, the contract between the Greek State and EAS was revoked, on the basis that the EAS had violated the terms of the contract due to delays in the destruction process, (b) that on 18 December 2010, EAS filed a request for suspension of the execution of the arbitral award to the Administrative Court of Appeals, and (c) that on 8 February 2011 the Administrative Court of Appeals issued an order which suspended the execution of the arbitral award of 2010 until the final decision of the Court of Appeals is issued. Greece informed the Standing Committee that the main proceeding of the Administrative Court of Appeals is scheduled to take place on 27 September 2012 and that Greece's Ministry of Defence has requested an expedition of this proceeding in order that it can take place sooner.
25. Information provided by Ukraine in 2012 in accordance with its Article 7 transparency obligations indicates that as of 31 December 2011, **Ukraine** had 5,939,905 stockpiled anti-personnel mines that remained to be destroyed, including 5,786,704 PFM mines. On 21 May 2012, Ukraine informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that 6,720 PFM-1 and PFM-1S mines have been destroyed in 2012, implying that 5,933,185 stockpiled anti-personnel mines remained. Ukraine also informed the Standing Committee that by mid-July it would have financed the destruction of 4,000 OZM-4 type anti-personnel mines.
26. Ukraine further informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that the timeline for the completion of destruction is still to be defined. Ukraine indicated that with US\$ 1 million in funds provided by Norway the incinerator facility at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant has been modernised, that final tests on this site were carried out on 26 August 2011 and that when appropriate funding is provided the Pavlograd plant will be able to destroy more than one million PFM-1 mines per year. It was also recalled that the 10MSP's Geneva Progress Report recorded that the destruction of anti-personnel mines had been identified as a priority that

could be financed under the European Union's European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

27. Ukraine also informed the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that the destruction of 3 million anti-personnel mines has been included in the second phase of a NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund project in Ukraine, and that in February 2012 all necessary legislative procedures were completed to endorse an implementation agreement with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to supervise the procedure and costs. Ukraine also expressed its appreciation that the EC has reserved funds for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines by Ukraine, indicated that costs for this phase of destruction would be shared with the EU covering 60 percent of costs and Ukraine 40 percent of costs, and called for all parties involved in the destruction process to implement "additional coordination measures" so that the necessary funding would arrive and destruction could begin.
28. States Parties again expressed concern that three States Parties have failed to comply with the four-year deadline to destroy or ensure the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned, possessed or under their jurisdiction or control. They encouraged the early completion of stockpile destruction programmes and recalled that the Cartagena Action Plan provides guidelines for getting back into the status of compliance.<sup>9</sup> It was recalled that at the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have missed their deadlines for completion of obligations under Article 4 will provide an expected completion date.<sup>10</sup> It was noted that some States Parties in question have not yet done so. It was also noted that all States Parties have a role in being vigilant in ensuring that those with stockpile destruction programmes are on track to meet their obligations, including through the provision of international cooperation and assistance. In addition, it was again noted that Belarus, Greece and Ukraine each have expressed a deep commitment to the Convention and the fulfilment of their obligations.
29. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, it was recalled that at the 11MSP South Sudan reported that, while it did not possess any stockpiled anti-personnel mines, it had uncovered stocks that had been abandoned in former military camps and that it would destroy these mines during the dry season in 2012.
30. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, it was recalled that, at the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will, when previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, paragraphs 1(b) and 2 of the Convention and take advantage of other informal means to share such information as soon as possible and destroy these anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority.<sup>11</sup>
31. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, the **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** recalled that at the 11MSP it has reported that its armed forces, in an effort to determine what munitions would need to be destroyed in accordance with obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, had discovered eight containers containing PFM-1S type anti-personnel mines. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia informed the Standing Committee that, on 10 May 2012, it destroyed this previously unknown stockpile, which included 1,248 PFM-1S mines. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia thanked the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) for their support in the destruction process.

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<sup>9</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #7, #8 and #9.

<sup>10</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #9.

<sup>11</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #12.

32. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, **Nigeria**, in noting that it is a country that has experienced civil war and thus had munitions stored in numerous locations throughout its territory, indicated that, following a ministerial directive, the Nigerian military is taking steps to reassess the munitions in its inventory to determine whether previously unknown stocks exist. Nigeria reaffirmed that, should such stocks be found, it will comply with its obligations and its Cartagena Action Plan commitments.
33. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, it was recalled that, at the 11MSP, **Guinea Bissau** indicated that a small stockpile of anti-personnel mines had been found in Quebo and Gabu military bases during a joint assessment mission conducted by Guinea Bissau and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to identify the quantity of Guinea Bissau storage ammunitions. It was further recalled that 7 PMN type mines and two original boxes of POMZ-2 type mines were found and that Guinea Bissau had indicated that it would destroy these mines as soon as possible but no later than 31 March 2012.
34. In 2012, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Germany and Romania, sought to act upon the commitment the States Parties made in the Cartagena Action Plan to “seize every opportunity to promote and encourage adherence to the norms of the Convention”.<sup>12</sup> They did so by encouraging States not parties to participate in the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee and by providing States not parties with an opportunity to share information on steps they are taking to adhere to the norms of the Convention (i.e., by volunteering information on stockpiles they possessed). While no State not party provided additional information, the Co-Chairs recalled that some States not parties have voluntarily provided information on the stocks in their possession and that others have provided what they refer to as voluntary Article 7 reports although in some of these documents no information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines has been provided and in other instances it is ambiguous. The Co-Chairs noted in particular the following:
- a. **Poland** has regularly voluntarily furnished information on stockpiles, indicating most recently that it has 200,013 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in its possession. Poland has also voluntarily provided information that indicates that it has progressively reduced its stockpile of anti-personnel mines with mines withdrawn from its inventories and dismantled.
  - b. **Mongolia**, in 2007, voluntarily reported that it possesses 206,417 anti-personnel mines. In addition, at the 10MSP Mongolia reported that it had destroyed 100 anti-personnel mines at a test destruction, bringing its number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines down to 206,317. As well Mongolia informed the 10MSP that it would destroy another 380 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in 2011.
  - c. The **Lao PDR**, 2011, voluntarily reported that it has a small stockpile of anti-personnel mines but has not provided information on the types and quantities of the mines held.
  - d. **Azerbaijan**, in 2008 and 2009, voluntarily provided information on various aspects of the landmine situation in Azerbaijan but it did not include information on stockpiles held.
  - e. **Morocco** has regularly voluntarily provided information on various aspects of the landmine situation in Morocco but has not included information on stockpiles held other than to say that it does not possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines which could be destroyed.

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<sup>12</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #3.

- f. **Sri Lanka** in 2005 voluntarily provided information on various aspects of the landmines situation in Sri Lanka but with respect to stockpiled anti-personnel mines indicated that “the information is not furnished in the present report” and that “with regard to future reports, the position will be reviewed, taking into account all relevant factors.”

### III. Mine clearance

35. The Phnom Penh Progress Report recorded that as of 2 December 2011, there were 36 States Parties that had formally indicated they had to fulfil the obligation contained in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention. In addition, the Phnom Penh Progress Report recorded that, in addition to these 36 States Parties, 2 States Parties – Germany and Hungary – informed the States Parties that they suspected areas under their jurisdiction or control may contain anti-personnel mines.
36. Since the 11MSP, [four] States Parties – **Denmark, Guinea Bissau, Jordan** and [**Uganda**] – reported that they have completed implementation of Article 5. Denmark’s implementation challenge involved addressing 186 hectares of area known or suspected to contain mines on the Skallingen Peninsula, which is an internationally recognised protected area due to its environmental significance. Guinea-Bissau’s efforts to comply with Article 5 involved clearing or otherwise declaring safe 5.8 million square metres of areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines and destroying 3,724 anti-personnel mines, 318 other mines and 182,000 other explosive remnants of war. In fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, Jordan cleared more than 60 million square metres of areas known or suspected to contain mines with cleared areas subsequently made available for major development projects, including for agriculture, religious pilgrimages and tourism. [INSERT SENTENCE ON UGANDA]
37. Also since the 11MSP, **Germany** formally reported that a former military training area, Wittstock, in the state of Brandenburg, is suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. In addition, **Hungary** formally reported that a section of the Hungarian-Croatian border between the municipalities of Matty and Kölked is suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. As well, one State Party – **Burundi** – which had informed the 11MSP that it had completed implementation of Article 5 subsequently formally reported 58 areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.
38. There are now [35] States Parties that have formally indicated that they must still fulfil the obligation contained in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. In addition, on 23 May 2012, **Niger** informed the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies of one area, totalling 2,400 square metres, known to contain mines within Niger. As well, it was recalled that South Sudan had informed the 11MSP of areas within **South Sudan** that are known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. Also, **Somalia**, for which the Convention enters into force on 1 October 2012, has made it clear that it will have obligations under Article 5.
39. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have been granted an extension to their initial Article 5 deadline will complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible but not later than their extended deadlines, ensure progress toward completion proceeds in

accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests, and report regularly on such progress.<sup>13</sup> Since the 11MSP, States Parties that have been granted extensions on deadlines continued efforts to act in accordance with their Cartagena Summit commitments.

40. **Algeria...**

41. **Argentina** indicated in its request that, as it “does not exercise territorial control over the land to be demined,” the plan submitted as part of the request is a “schematic plan”. Argentina has pointed out that this plan will be developed in detail and will be implemented as soon as Argentina does exercise control over the areas in question or when both Argentina and the United Kingdom “reach agreement over making progress in such planning.” Since the 11MSP, there has been no change regarding the exercise of control over the areas in question.

42. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported that a total of 1,312 square kilometres of “mine suspected area” remains, including 289 square kilometres of known “mine risk areas”. Bosnia and Herzegovina further reported that while its 2009-2019 strategic plan is being review, the current estimate is that the total of “mine suspected area” will be reduced by 440 square kilometres by the end of 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina also indicated that it is falling behind schedule in terms of its plan to complete implementation by its 1 March 2019 deadline, mainly due to a lack of funding.

43. **Cambodia...**

44. **Chad...**

45. **Chile...**

46. **Colombia...**

47. **Congo...**

48. At the May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, **Croatia** indicated that at the end of 2011, 745 square kilometres remained to be cleared or reduced by surveys and released for the use by civilian populations. Croatia further indicated that during the first four months of 2012, the mine suspected areas was reduced by 17,902,180 square metres – 11,939,684 square metres cleared and 5,962,494 square metres reduced by general survey.

49. The **Democratic Republic of the Congo ...**

50. **Ecuador...**

51. **Eritrea...**

52. **Mauritania ...**

53. At the May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, **Mozambique** reported that there are 40 districts in 8 provinces (Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo) in which there remain 377 mined areas totalling 16,042,136 square metres. Mozambique further reported that by the end of 2012 it intended address 254

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<sup>13</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #13.

sites totalling 8,039, 314 square metres, thereby completing implementation in the provinces of Gaza, Cabo Delgado and Niassa as well as in 25 districts in other provinces. Mozambique also reported that in 2012 it aimed to mobilise the amount of funds required to ensure completion in all parts of Mozambique by its 1 March 2014 deadline.

54. **Peru...**

55. **Senegal** has identified 12 localities where the presence of anti-personnel mines has been confirmed and the total area is estimated to be 79,000 square metres. Non-technical surveys have identified suspected areas in 46 localities and the total area to be released is still estimated to be 3.5 million square metres until surveys are finalised. Senegal intends to employ 3 operators which would cover 750,000 square metres a year, i.e., 3 million square metres over a four-year period until its 1 March 2016 deadline. Fifteen (15) areas are to be addressed prior to the Third Review Conference in 2014. Senegal also cautioned that the release of known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines by its 1 March 2016 deadline remains dependent upon the security situation and the availability of sufficient financial resources to support demining work.

56. **Tajikistan** reported that 167 areas totalling 6.5 square kilometres known to contain mines along the Tajik-Afghan border and the 31 areas totalling 2.3 square kilometres in the Central Region known to contain mines remain. Tajikistan noted, however, that most of these areas do not have precise geographic descriptions. Tajikistan also reported that, by the end of 2014, approximately 4 square kilometres of the current estimate of 8.8 square kilometres of area known to contain mines would have been addressed. In addition, Tajikistan indicated that if capacity and resources remain constant, it will be in a position to complete implementation by its 1 April 2020 deadline.

57. **Thailand...**

58. **The United Kingdom...**

59. **Venezuela...**

60. **Yemen...**

61. **Zimbabwe...**

62. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control will do their utmost to identify, if they have not yet done so, the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced, and report this information.<sup>14</sup> It was also agreed that these States Parties will do their utmost to ensure that all available methods are applied where and as relevant, by developing and implementing applicable national standards, policies and procedures for releasing land through technical and nontechnical means that are accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the involvement of women and men in the acceptance process, and, that such States Parties would provide information on the areas already released, disaggregated by release through clearance, technical survey and non-technical survey.<sup>15</sup> As well, it was agreed that these States Parties will do their utmost to take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly reviewing national mine action strategies and

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<sup>14</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #14.

<sup>15</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #15 and #17.

associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal frameworks, inform the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance on their implementation, and provide annually, in accordance with Article 7, precise information on the number, location and size of mined areas, anticipated particular technical or operational challenges, plans to clear or otherwise release these areas.<sup>16</sup> Since the 11MSP, States Parties continued efforts to act in accordance with their Cartagena Summit commitments.

63. **Afghanistan...**

64. **Angola...**

65. **Bhutan...**

66. **Burundi...**

67. In its extension request submitted in 2012, **Cyprus** has indicated that implementation would be complete with respect to all mined areas under the effective control of Cyprus by Cyprus' 1 July 2013 deadline. Cyprus further indicated that, with respect to areas outside of its effective control, it would again evaluate the situation and form a fresh opinion as to whether matters have evolved so that the Republic is, or may in the future be, able to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines and to arrive at a specific assessment of the time required for destruction.

68. **Ethiopia...**

69. **Gambia...**

70. **Germany** reported that the area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines has now been reduced by means of historical research to 1.2 hectares and the priority is to carry out a technical survey of the area. Germany also reported that it is committed to completing the technical survey, and if required, destroy all anti-personnel mines in the suspected area within the timeframe strictly necessary and that it will submit an action plan before the end of the 12MSP.

71. **Hungary...**

72. **Iraq...**

73. **Serbia** reported there remain 10 areas known to contain anti-personnel mines totalling 1,385,215 square metres and 53 areas suspect to contain anti-personnel mines totalling approximately 2,000,000 square metres. Serbia further reported that areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines would be surveyed by 1 July 2013 to confirm or refute the presence of mines. Serbia also reported that, due to uncertainty of funding, it is not in a position to confirm that it will complete implementation by its 1 March 2014 deadline

74. **Sudan...**

75. **Turkey...**

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<sup>16</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #16 and #17.

76. The 11MSP noted that the Convention is silent on how to address situations where States Parties, which never have reported Article 5 obligations, discover previously unknown mined areas. The 11MSP further noted a need to develop a rational response to such situations which is firmly anchored in the object and purpose of the Convention and which does not undermine the legal obligations to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon as possible. In this context, the meeting requested that the President, supported by the Coordinating Committee, consult with all relevant stakeholders to prepare a constructive discussion on this matter at the May 2012 meetings of the Standing Committees with a view to recommendations on this matter being submitted for consideration at the 12MSP. [INSERT CONTENT AS RELATES TO HOW THIS MATTER EVOLVES]
77. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties recalled the decisions taken at the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties (7MSP) to establish a process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions of Article 5 deadlines, noted the suggested outline provided by the ISU to assist requesting States Parties in organising the content of their requests and expressed the view that the Article 5 extensions process has led to the establishment of an orderly and predictable calendar for submitting, analysing and considering extension requests. With respect to such requests, at the Cartagena Summit it was agreed that States Parties that have reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control but due to exceptional circumstances need to request an extension to their 10-year deadline will inform the States Parties of these exceptional circumstances in due time, develop the extension request in line with the recommendations made by the 7MSP and utilise the opportunity for informal dialogue with the group mandated to analyse the extension request.<sup>17</sup>
78. The Phnom Penh Progress Report recalled the importance of the timely submission of extension requests to the overall effective functioning of the Article 5 extension process and, in this context recommended that all States Parties that wish to submit requests do so no later than 31 March of the year when the request would be considered (i.e., the year prior to the State Party's deadline). Since the 11MSP, requests were received by the President from Afghanistan (on 29 March 2012), Angola (on 30 March 2012), Cyprus (on 30 April 2012), and Zimbabwe (on 30 March 2012). In keeping with the decisions of the 7MSP, the President informed the States Parties of the receipt of these requests and instructed the ISU to make these requests available to all interested actors on the Convention's web site.
79. Further to the commitments made at the Cartagena Summit, representatives of each requesting State Party and the group mandated to analyse the extension requests engaged in informal dialogue with a view to the analysing group seeking a better understanding of the requests and to offer advice and suggestions to requesting States Parties. This cooperative process resulted in [INSERT CONTENT AS RELATES TO HOW THIS MATTER EVOLVES]
80. It was noted that the following State Party with an Article 5 deadline that occurs in 2013 did not submit a request for an extension: Gambia. It was also noted that the following States Parties with deadlines in 2014 will submit extension requests in 2013: [INSERT LIST]. It was further noted that [INSERT NUMBER] additional States Parties, [INSERT LIST], have deadlines that occur in 2014.
81. The 11MSP noted that the Article 5 extension request process places a heavy burden on the representatives of those States Parties that are mandated to analyse the requests and in this context recommended that those States Parties mandated to analyse requests in 2012 reflect on the process to date with a view to identifying efficient methods to ensure that high quality

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<sup>17</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #21.

requests and analyses are prepared and with a view to recommendations on this matter being submitted for consideration the 12MSP. [INSERT CONTENT AS RELATES TO HOW THIS MATTER EVOLVES]

82. To increase the knowledge and build the capacity of representatives of States Parties mandated to analyse requests, the ISU convened a workshop on 30 March 2012 for these States Parties.
83. The 11MSP noted with satisfaction the efforts undertaken pursuant to the decision of the 10MSP to request the Coordinating Committee to organise the week of meetings of the Standing Committees in 2011 in such a way that time is allocated for Co-Chairs, individual States Parties and others to experiment with the new ways of using the Intersessional Work Programme to more intensively focus on national contexts or to otherwise creatively support progress in the application of the Cartagena Action Plan. The 11MSP encouraged the Coordinating Committee to consider similar efforts in 2012. Pursuant to this, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Indonesia and Zambia, used a small-group format to provide an interactive forum for in-depth cooperation discussions on the progress made and the road ahead for two States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Chad) that are fulfilling commitments made in their Article 5 extension requests.
84. As noted, at the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to ensure that all available methods for the full and expedient implementation of Article 5 (1) are applied where and as relevant, by developing and implementing applicable national standards, policies and procedures for releasing land through technical and non-technical means that are accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the involvement of women and men in the acceptance process.<sup>18</sup> In the context of its land release programme, the GICHD has supported, since the 11MSP, Cambodia, Colombia, Jordan, Mozambique, South Sudan and Thailand in the development or enhancement of a national policy and national mine action standards that included chapters on releasing land through non-technical and technical means.
85. As noted, at the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties committed to take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly reviewing national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal frameworks.<sup>19</sup> Since the 11MSP, the GICHD assisted South Sudan in the development of its national mine action strategy for the period 2012-2016 by facilitating participatory workshops and drafting the strategy. GICHD support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo included assistance in the development of a multi-year mine action plan. At the request of the ISU, the GICHD assisted and advised Chad in determining the remaining known and suspected hazardous areas, quantifying the problem in terms of location, verifying its contamination data and updating its database.

#### **IV. Victim assistance**

86. At the Cartagena Summit, while noting the progress that has been made in achieving the victim assistance aim of the Convention, the States Parties recognised that the most identifiable gains had been process-related and that the real promise of the Convention is to make a difference on the ground, in the lives of survivors, the families of those killed or injured, and their communities.<sup>20</sup> The States Parties expressed the view that a persistent challenge remains in translating increased understanding on victim assistance into tangible improvements in the quality of daily life of mine victims. To this end, the States Parties expressed their resolve to

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<sup>18</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #15.

<sup>19</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #16.

<sup>20</sup> Review of the operation and status of the Convention: 2005-2009, paragraph 112.

provide adequate age- and gender-sensitive assistance to mine victims, through a holistic and integrated approach that includes emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and economic inclusion in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, with the aim of ensuring their full and effective participation and inclusion in the social, cultural, economic and political life of their communities.<sup>21</sup> Also to this end, the States Parties, particularly those accountable to and responsible for the well-being of significant numbers of mine victims, agreed to reinforce their efforts and do their utmost to facilitate measurable progress by applying 11 specific actions in the Cartagena Action Plan related to victim assistance.<sup>22</sup> Since the 11MSP, States Parties continued efforts to act in accordance with their Cartagena Summit commitments.

87. In noting that the States Parties find themselves approximately half-way between the 2009 Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World and the Convention's Third Review Conference in 2014, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Algeria and Croatia, highlighted that an opportunity exists in 2012 to prepare a mid-term assessment of the Cartagena Action Plan. This mid-term assessment was submitted by the Co-Chairs to the 12MSP as document # INSERT NUMBER.
88. INSERT A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CO-CHAIRS' MID-TERM ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT
89. On the margins of both the May 2012 meetings of the Standing Committees and the 12MSP, the Co-Chairs, with the support of the ISU, again convened parallel programmes for victim assistance experts. The purpose of these parallel programmes was to enhance national efforts aimed at coordinating and monitoring the implementation of national plans. Financial support necessary to stage the 12MSP parallel programme was provided by Switzerland.
90. It was noted that [INSERT NUMBER] States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention are also parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), including [INSERT NUMBER] of the States Parties reporting responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors: INSERT LIST.
91. As indicated above, the 11MSP noted with satisfaction the efforts undertaken pursuant to the decision of the 10MSP to request the Coordinating Committee to organise the week of meetings of the Standing Committees in 2011 in such a way that time is allocated for Co-Chairs, individual States Parties and others to experiment with the new ways of using the Intersessional Work Programme to more intensively focus on national contexts or to otherwise creatively support progress in the application of the Cartagena Action Plan. The 11MSP encouraged the Coordinating Committee to consider similar efforts in 2012. Pursuant to this, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance used a small-group format to provide an interactive forum for in-depth cooperation discussions on the progress made and the road ahead for two States Parties (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq) that have reported the responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors.
92. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to collect all necessary data, disaggregated by sex and age, in order to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate adequate national policies, plans and legal frameworks including by assessing the needs and priorities of mine victims and the availability and quality of relevant services, make such data available to all relevant stakeholders and ensure that such efforts contribute to national injury surveillance and

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<sup>21</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, paragraph 12.

<sup>22</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #23 to #33.

other relevant data collection systems for use in programme planning.<sup>23</sup> Since the 11MSP, the GICHD and the Centre for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) of the James Madison University launched a study on accident and victim information systems aimed to contribute to a better understanding of how victim-related data are collected, compiled and analysed, and how the data are used to inform mine action operations. This study will offer lessons for States Parties wishing to improve their information management practices and systems for the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of their victim assistance plans of action. It may also inform about possibilities as to how such systems could become a platform for broader national disability programming.

## **V. Other matters essential for achieving the convention's aims**

### **(a) Cooperation and assistance**

93. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance, Albania and Thailand, recalled that the States Parties, for over two years, have discussed cooperation and assistance in general terms and that it would now be useful to move to exploring specific ideas in more detail in order to advance the cooperation and assistance agenda. Given this, the Co-Chairs structured an agenda for the May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee which sought to address the following three concrete ideas: the possibility of developing an information exchange tool, or platform for partnerships; options of trust funds to ensure the continuity of resources; and, the availability of assistance and procedures to obtain it.
94. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance used a small-group format to provide an interactive forum for in-depth discussion on the possibility of developing an information exchange tool. With respect to this, it was recalled that at the 2011 meeting of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance, Thailand stated that, while financial assistance is very much needed and appreciated, other types of non-financial assistance – such as material, equipment, expertise, et cetera – are also essential, and that a tool to exchange information on these other types of assistance may be beneficial. To frame the discussion, the Co-Chairs asked participants to consider three questions: If an information exchange tool were to be established, what information should it contain? How should it be organized? What experiences have actors had in accessing information about available funding, technical support, or other forms of cooperation and assistance for implementation? What are the gaps in information about available assistance?
95. In terms of perceived gaps in available information and suggestions for information to be contained in an information exchange tool, it was noted that all States Parties are potential contributors and therefore any information exchange tool should house information on the assistance that any State Party may be in a position to provide. Additional information on available financial assistance may be desirable, but a key aim of the information exchange tool should be to serve as a place where those with needs can search for the full range of possible assistance, including technical support and equipment. “Match-making” could be facilitated by the information tool containing national contact points. Information contained should facilitate “south-south” cooperation, including the availability of financial resources necessary to fuel such cooperation. While the pre-occupation with information on available resources appears to relate mainly to Article 5 implementation, victim assistance should be included in any information exchange tool.

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<sup>23</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #25

96. In terms of ways and means of developing an information exchange tool, the means suggested most frequently by discussion participants was an internet tool, with many suggesting that it need not be a complicated endeavour. It was noted that the more complex this effort was, the more expensive it may be. Some suggested that the ISU could house such an information tool as part of the Convention's existing website. Some suggested that the information tool could simply link to other sites while others suggested, that to make it more user-friendly, the information tool itself should house information.
97. On the basis of the discussion, the Co-Chairs sought to investigate with the ISU the development an information exchange tool on a trial basis with an evaluation made after a certain period of time, including by drawing up data related to the number of visits and types of information accessed. The Co-Chairs acknowledged that in proceeding, care would have to be taken to fill an actual information gap and not duplicate the wealth of existing on-line and other information sources, including Landmine Monitor and Article 7 reports. Also with respect to preventing duplication, it was noted, as concerns victim assistance, efforts should be made to liaise with those supporting the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities given the central place of cooperation and assistance in that instrument.
98. Following the 11MSP, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance requested that the ISU prepare a discussion paper entitled "Exploring the options of trust funds to ensure the continuity of resources", which the ISU Director presented to the Standing Committee on 25 May 2012.<sup>24</sup> In response, many States Parties, while expressing the view that there was no need to establish a new trust fund, agreed with the paper's conclusion that a great deal of potential exists with respect to mechanisms that are already in place or that could easily come into being at the national level. It was highlighted that the States Parties are, with few exceptions, all Member States of the United Nations and have the opportunity to voice their preferences with regarding to existing UN mechanisms. It was further highlighted that States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention make up a majority of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and therefore could help ensure that a sound link is made between these instruments once the UN Partnership to promote the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Multi-Donor Trust Fund becomes operational. In addition, it was highlighted that the international community as a whole has largely embraced the international aid effectiveness agenda and could do what it can to relate demining and victim assistance with national development strategies and cooperation programmes, and the funds established to implement them.
99. In terms of the availability of assistance and procedures to obtain it, the Standing Committee benefited from presentations from a donor, a non-governmental organisation and a national mine action authority, thus highlighting that a wide range of actors and not solely traditional donors are in position to provide assistance. These actors and others shared information on what each has to offer, for whom it is available and how it may be obtained.
100. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties committed to make their needs known to other States Parties and relevant organisations if they require financial, technical or other forms of international cooperation and assistance to meet obligations.<sup>25</sup> In addition, States Parties with obligations to fulfil committed to map the national resources available to meet their obligations and their needs for international cooperation and assistance and States Parties in a position to

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/IWP/SC-may12/Discussion-papers/SC-May2012-e-Trust-Funds-Draft.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #35.

do so committed to promptly assist States Parties that have communicated needs for support.<sup>26</sup> On the basis of information provided by States Parties in their transparency reports, in updates at the meetings of the Standing Committees and through other means, the following 28 States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 of the Convention have expressed requirements for financial, technical or other forms of assistance: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Iraq, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. An overview of assistance obtained and national resources made available for Article 5 implementation by these States Parties is contained in Annex III.

101. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties committed to ensure cooperation among all relevant actors to improve national and international policies and development strategies, enhance effectiveness in mine action and reduce the need to rely on international personnel.<sup>27</sup> In this context, and based on the findings of case studies, the GICHD published a policy brief which provides mine action practitioners with an outline of key messages, main issues and recommendations related to transitioning mine action programmes to full national ownership.
102. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to contribute to further development of the United Nations' International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to be used as a frame of reference to establish national standards and operational procedures for addressing all aspects of mine and other explosive ordnance contamination.<sup>28</sup> Since the 11MSP, efforts have continued to finalise IMAS on land release and information management. These will lead to a clearer and more consistent recording of released land and will facilitate progress to be measured. In addition, the GICHD has assisted two States Parties – **Jordan** and **Mozambique** – in the development of national standards and in reviewing existing standards.
103. At the Cartagena Summit, States Parties in a position to do so made a commitment, in the spirit of the Convention's aims, to endeavour to continue supporting States Parties that have completed their Article 5 obligations in their efforts to address the humanitarian consequences resulting from mine and other explosive remnants of war contamination.<sup>29</sup> Since the 11MSP, one State Party that has completed implementation of Article 5 – Albania – has expressed the need for assistance in addressing the needs of victims of mines and other explosive remnants of war, and one other State Party – Palau – has expressed appreciation for support it receives from States Parties for addressing its challenges related to unexploded ordnance.

**(b) Transparency and the exchange of information**

104. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have not submitted their initial Article 7 report will immediately fulfil their obligation to initially submit and annually update Article 7 transparency reports.<sup>30</sup> At the close of the 11MSP, one (1) State Party – Equatorial Guinea – had not yet complied with the obligation to report as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party, on the matters for which transparency information is required in accordance with Article 7.1. In addition, 84 States Parties had and 71 States Parties had not in 2011 provided updated information, as required, covering the previous calendar year.

<sup>26</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Actions #34 and 37.

<sup>27</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #51.

<sup>28</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #49.

<sup>29</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #40.

<sup>30</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #54.

105. Since the 11MSP, [3] States Parties have not complied with their obligation to report in accordance with Article 7.1 [Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan and Tuvalu]. Equatorial Guinea's initial report was due on 28 August 1999, South Sudan's on 5 January 2012 and Tuvalu's on 28 August 2012. In addition in 2012, the following [72] States Parties did not provide updated information covering calendar year 2011 in accordance with Article 7.2 as required: [Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Vanuatu].
106. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will maximise and take full advantage of the flexibility of the Article 7 reporting process as a tool to assist in implementation, including through the reporting format "Form J" to provide information on matters which may assist in the implementation process and in resource mobilization, such as information on international cooperation and assistance, victim assistance efforts and needs and information on measures being taken to ensure gender sensitisation in all aspects of mine action.<sup>31</sup> Since the 11MSP, the following 43 States Parties made use of "Form J" to provide information on matters related to resources, cooperation and assistance: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Qatar, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
107. Since the 11MSP, the following 18 States Parties made use of "Form J" to provide information on victim assistance efforts and needs Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and Zimbabwe. The following 20 States Parties provided information on international cooperation and assistance: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, the following two States Parties provided information on measures being taken to ensure gender sensitisation in aspects of mine action: Afghanistan and Albania.
108. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that all States Parties will regularly review the number of anti-personnel mines retained for purposes permitted under Article 3 to ensure that it constitutes the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes and destroy all those exceeding that number.<sup>32</sup> It was agreed that all States Parties will annually report, on a voluntary basis, on the plans for and actual use of anti-personnel mines retained, explain any increase or decrease in the number of retained anti-personnel mines.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #55.

<sup>32</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #56.

<sup>33</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #57.

109. Since the 11MSP, **Angola** reported 1,073 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2010 and indicated that the substantial decrease in the amount of retained anti-personnel mines was due to the fact that the last reports did not mention mines used for training. Mines retained are used by the Angolan Armed Forces for instruction purposes of different systems (manual, mechanic and canine) conducted by demining operators, especially the Demining Technical School located in Viana/Luanda. **Argentina** reported 179 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011 and that 169 anti-personnel mines were used in 2011 to train Marine Infantry engineers in techniques and procedures for the destruction of anti-personnel mines and 10 for research purposes. Argentina also reported on plans for the future use of mines for permitted purposes. **Australia** reported 139 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011 and that numbers are regularly reviewed, with planning underway to destroy a significant portion of training mines in the next 12 months, also indicating that only 100 anti-personnel mines in stock have serviceable detonator assemblies.
110. **Belarus** reported that 8 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during training in February 2012. **Belgium** reported that 59 anti-personnel were used in 2011 for the operational training of the Engineer Combat Units deminers and to train military former combat units in "Mine Risk Education". **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported 361 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011. **Brazil** reported 1,063 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011 and that it retains anti-personnel mines to allow the Brazilian army to adequately participate in international demining activities. **Chile** reported 118 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than in 2010 and that 42 were destroyed in 2011 to train the deminers of the Chilean army and the Chilean navy in the detection, deactivation and destruction of anti-personnel mines. **Croatia** reported 73 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that anti-personnel mines were used during testing and evaluating of demining machines on the test polygon in Cerovec, CROMAC-CTDT Ltd. The **Czech Republic** reported 30 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that retained anti-personnel are used to train and/or educate EOD personnel in mine detection, mine clearance and destruction techniques and for additional courses within the framework of preparation to NATO standards for ISAF operations in Afghanistan.
111. **Denmark** reported 14 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and that it retains mines for research, development and training in mine detection by the Danish Defence Research. **Ecuador** used 5 anti-personnel mines in 2011 with these mines used in a National Demining School training course. **Eritrea** reported 71 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011 and indicated that the number of mines retained was reviewed downwards to only retain the very minimum number necessary for training. **France** reported 76 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011. **Germany** reported 71 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that the necessary amounts, types and estimated future requirements are reviewed on an annual basis. Germany reported that anti-personnel mines are retained for the development of safeguards for wheeled vehicles against the effects of mine explosions, the testing and evaluation of personal protective equipment (PPE) against the effect of mine explosions, the testing and evaluation of metal detectors and multi sensor systems, the testing and evaluation of mechanical demining equipment, the documentation of the ageing process of explosives contained in mines for the development of specific disposal / clearing methods and the training of dogs at the Federal Armed Forces School of Dog Handling.
112. **Ireland** retained 2 fewer anti-personnel mines than it did in 2011 and reported that the Irish Defence Forces use live anti-personnel mines in the development and validation of mine render safe procedures, in training personnel in these procedures, in testing and validating mine

clearance equipment, and in the training of personnel in the use of such equipment. In addition, Ireland indicated that, as the number of anti-personnel mines currently possessed by it for permitted purposes has fallen to a very low level (with only 62 remaining as at 31 December 2011), the acquisition of replacement anti-personnel mines for the same purposes, as permitted by Article 3 of the Convention, is likely to become necessary at some stage in the future. **Italy** reported 26 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that Italy uses mines for a training programme for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and mine detection dogs (MDD) carried out by the Italian Army and that this programme is structured in 5 distinct courses, aimed at enabling engineers to perform specific tasks of increasing difficulties, with every year between 300 and 350 EOD specialists being trained and qualified.

113. **Japan** reported 254 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that the mines it retains are used for education and training purposes for mine detection and clearance, and the research and development for mine clearance equipment. **Lithuania** reported 75 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011. **Luxembourg** reported the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines it had reported retained under Article 3 (599 in total). **Mozambique** reported 252 fewer anti-personnel mines than it had reported in 2011 indicating that the three demining operators in Mozambique maintain a stock of anti-personnel mines for the training of deminers and the training and testing of mine detection animals. In addition, the Mozambique Defence Forces retain a stock of anti-personnel mines for training and refreshing courses for the Defence Forces demining platoon. The **Netherlands** reported 191 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011. **Slovakia** reported 100 fewer anti-personnel mines than it did in 2011 and indicated that 98 anti-personnel were destroyed by the National Centre of EOD Novaky and 2 were destroyed for the purpose of anti-mine measurements development in the Military Technical and Testing Institute Záhorie (project MUNLIK). **Spain** reported 11 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that it has used mines for the development of the “Advanced Global System to Eliminate Anti-Personnel Landmines” and for demining training courses.
114. **Sweden** reported 56 fewer anti-personnel retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that the Swedish Armed Forces use anti-personnel mines in mine clearance training carried out at the Swedish Demining and EOD Centre Centre, providing the deminer with experience of actually clearing live mines. **Thailand** reported 92 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it reported in 2011. **Tunisia** reported 20 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011. The **United Kingdom** reported 362 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it had reported in 2011 and indicated that it retains anti-personnel mines with the objective of identifying the anti-personnel mine threat to the United Kingdom Armed Forces, together with maintaining and improving detection, protection, clearance and destruction techniques including for improvised explosive devices. **Yemen** reported 240 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it did in 2011. **Zimbabwe** reported 50 fewer anti-personnel mines retained than it reported in 2011.
115. **Cambodia** reported 273 more anti-personnel mines retained than it reported in 2011, that it uses anti-personnel mines for refresher trainings of EOD teams and will need them for the future MDD/EDD testing site which will be accrediting all MDD/EDD in the country. The **Democratic Republic of the Congo** reported 5 more anti-personnel mines than it did in 2011 indicating that the anti-personnel mines retained were all defused. **Jordan** reported 50 more anti-personnel mines retained than it reported in 2011. **Senegal** reported 9 more anti-personnel mines retained than it reported in 2011.

116. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have maintained under the provision of Article 3, the same number of anti-personnel mines over periods of years, and have not reported on the use of such mines for permitted purposes or on concrete plans for their use, would be encouraged to report on such use and such plans and to review whether these anti-personnel mines are needed and constitute the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and to destroy those that are in excess of this number.<sup>34</sup> **Algeria** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (5,970) that since 2010 it has reported retained. **Bangladesh** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (12,500) that it reported retained in 2007. **Benin** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (16) that it reported retained in 2007. **Bhutan** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (4,491) that it reported retained in 2007. **Bulgaria** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (3,672) that since 2010 it has reported retained. **Burundi** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (4) that since 2008 it has reported retained. **Cameroon** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (1,885) that it reported retained in 2009. **Canada** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,921) that since 2011 it has reported retained. **Cape Verde** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (120) that it reported retained in 2009. **Colombia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (586) that since 2007 it has reported retained. **Congo** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (322) that it reported retained in 2009. **Cyprus** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (500) that since 2010 it has reported retained.

117. **Djibouti** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (2,996) that it reported retained in 2005. **Ethiopia** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (303) that it reported retained in 2009. **Guinea Bissau** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (9) that it reported retained in 2009. **Honduras** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (826) that it reported retained in 2007. **Indonesia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,454) that since 2010 it has reported retained. **Kenya** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (3,000) that it reported retained in 2009. **Mali** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (600) that it reported retained in 2005. **Mauritania** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (728) that since 2004 it has reported retained. **Namibia** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (1,634) that it reported retained in 2010.

118. **Nicaragua** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (448) that it reported retained in 2011. **Niger** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (146) that it reported retained in 2009. **Nigeria** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (3,364) that since 2009 it has reported retained. **Peru** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,040) that since 2011 it has reported retained. **Portugal** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (694) that since 2011 it has reported retained and indicated that the 694 mines retained by the Portuguese Armed Forces are either inert or fuseless. In addition, Portugal reported that anti-personnel mines retained are used to train Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams in mine detection, clearance and destruction techniques and to provide basic mine awareness training to military personnel deployed in international missions. Twelve (12) personnel were trained in EOD skills in 2011. **Romania** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,500) that it has reported retained since 2004 and indicated that it uses anti-personnel mines in

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<sup>34</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #58.

regular training cycles for EOD personnel and engineers and for specific preparation of troops leaving to operational theatres. **Rwanda** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (65) that it reported retained in 2008.

119. **Slovenia** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (2,978) that it reported retained in 2011. **South Africa** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (4,355) that it reported retained in 2011. **Sudan** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,938) that since 2010 it has reported retained. **Turkey** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (15,100) that since 2010 it has reported retained. **Uganda** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (1,764) that since 2005 it has reported retained. **Tanzania** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (1,780) that it reported retained in 2009. **Uruguay** did not provide new information to update the number of anti-personnel mines (260) that it reported retained in 2008. **Venezuela** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (4,874) that since 2011 it has reported retained and indicated that it retains these mines for the development of mine detection, clearance and destruction techniques. **Zambia** reported no change in the number of anti-personnel mines (2,120) that since 2009 it has reported retained and indicated that training carried out previously covered mine identification and awareness, minefield marking and layout, detection and destruction techniques for mainly military personnel preparing for United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) deployment, combat engineers undergoing mandatory career progression courses, and national and regional military officers undergoing Command and Staff Courses.

120. **Botswana** did not provide new information since it reported in 2001 that it “maintains a small quantity of anti-personnel mines for training purposes and that this is important because in the past the Botswana Defence Force soldiers have been deployed to mine-infested countries on peace keeping assignments and there is need for soldiers to be trained in handling landmines.” **Burkina Faso** did not provide new information since it reported in 2008 that “nothing yet” was retained.

121. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Norway and Peru, wrote to States Parties to encourage them to make use of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention on 21 and 25 May 2012 to volunteer updated information on mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3. The Co-Chairs also expressed an interest in hearing from States Parties that have reported the same numbers retained for a number of years without having yet volunteered information on the purposes for which these mines have been retained and on plans for the use of them for permitted purposes. The invitation to provide updates at the Standing Committees was seized by 21 States Parties.

122. Since the 11MSP, Belgium, in its capacity as Coordinator of the Article 7 Contact Group, continued to promote the importance of transparency obligations and to emphasize the role of transparency and the exchange of information as a tool in the overall implementation of the Convention. Belgium noted that, since the 11MSP, despite efforts made to remind States Parties of their obligation to report and despite assistance offered to prepare reports, the reporting rate continued to decline. In this context, Belgium organised consultations with interested delegations on possible ways and means to increase both the reporting rate and the quality of information reported by States Parties. The informal Article 7 Contact Group met in the margins of the 21-25 May meetings of the Standing Committees to take stock of matters linked to reporting. The Contact Group highlighted the main challenges associated with reporting and discussed potential courses of action that could be pursued to improve reporting.

**(c) Measures to ensure compliance**

123. At the Cartagena Summit, it was agreed that States Parties that have not developed national implementation measures will, as a matter of urgency, develop and adopt legislative, administrative and other measures in accordance with Article 9, to fulfil their Convention obligations under this Article and thereby contributing to full compliance with the Convention.<sup>35</sup> At the close of the 11MSP, there were 63 States Parties that had reported that they had adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations and that there were 34 States Parties that had reported that they considered existing national laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention.<sup>36</sup> The remaining 59 States Parties had not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they considered that existing laws were sufficient to give effect to the Convention.

124. Since the 11MSP, one State Party, **Qatar**, indicated that it considered existing laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention.<sup>37</sup> In addition, since the 11MSP, the four States for which the Convention most recently entered into force – **Finland, Somalia, South Sudan and Tuvalu** – have not yet reported either having adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 or indicated that they consider existing laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention. There are now 63 States Parties that have reported that they had adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations, 35 States Parties that have reported that they considered existing national laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention and 60 States Parties have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they consider that existing laws are sufficient to give effect to the Convention. (See annex IV.)

125. Deep concern was expressed about reports alleging new use of anti-personnel mines in the territories of States Parties and calls were made for the States Parties concerned to fully investigate these allegations and to clarify matters as soon as possible.

126. Since the 11MSP, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued fulfilling the UN Secretary General's responsibility to prepare and update a list of names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts designated for fact finding missions authorised in accordance with Article 8.8. Since the 11MSP, [INSERT LIST OF STATES PARTIES] provided new or updated information for the list of experts.

**(d) Implementation support**

127. In adopting the "Directive from the States Parties to the ISU", the 10MSP agreed that the ISU shall "report in written form as well as orally on the activities, functioning and finances of the ISU to each Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference, and to informal meetings under the Convention as appropriate." At the 25 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the Director of the ISU provided a written and oral report. The report recorded the lengthy set of activities consistent with this mandate and

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<sup>35</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #59.

<sup>36</sup> The figures 63 and 34 are a correction with respect to the figures 62 and 35 that appeared in the 11MSP's Phnom Penh Progress Report to include Serbia in the list of States Parties that indicated that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 and remove it from the list of States Parties that consider existing laws to be sufficient to give effect to the Convention.

<sup>37</sup> Note verbale sent by the Permanent Mission of Qatar in Geneva to the Implementation Support Unit, 27 January 2012.

the ISU's 2012 work plan, and provided highlights of work undertaken by the ISU during the first five months of 2012.

128. With respect to its substantive efforts, in 2012 the ISU ....

129. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed that those in a position to do so would provide necessary financial resources for the effective operation of the Implementation Support Unit.<sup>38</sup> At the 11MSP, the States Parties took note and encouraged action on the recommendations made by the President of the 10MSP to preserve the results of the work undertaken in 2011 by an open-ended working group to improve the ISU's present funding model and to ensure sufficient contributions are provided to the ISU as long as the financing model remains unchanged. In the first quarter of 2012, the President used targeted fundraising appeals to complement common appeals which had been traditionally distributed to all States Parties. In addition, on 11 June 2012, the President issued a follow-up appeal to all States Parties which had not as of that date contributed to the ISU. Contributions in support of the ISU's 2012 work plan were received from the following States Parties: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, [Australia], Cambodia, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, [Germany], [Italy], Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway and [Switzerland].

130. In addition to carrying out its core work plan, the ISU executed other activities, in a manner consistent with its mandate, when additional funds were made available to fully fund these efforts. [INSERT DESCRIPTION OF THESE EFFORTS]

131. At the 11MSP, the States Parties approved the proposal presented by the 10MSP President which would see four States Parties in leadership position on each Standing Committee being reduced to two per Standing Committee with this proposal implemented in two phases. Pursuant to this decision and in keeping with established tradition, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention undertook the task of consulting with States Parties to identify a list of nominees to serve as new Co-Chairs following the 12MSP. On 2 May 2012, the Co-Chairs wrote to all States Parties to indicate that they were seeking one new State Party for each of the five Standing Committees. At the 21 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the Co-Chairs again reminded delegations of their written appeal. [On the basis of interest expressed to the Co-Chairs and consultations with interested delegations, the Co-Chairs proposed a set of five new States Parties which were elected at the 12MSP to serve two-year terms.]

132. As indicated above, the 11MSP noted with satisfaction the efforts undertaken pursuant to the decision of the 10MSP to request the Coordinating Committee to organise the week of meetings of the Standing Committees in 2011 in such a way that time is allocated for Co-Chairs, individual States Parties and others to experiment with the new ways of using the Intersessional Work Programme to more intensively focus on national contexts or to otherwise creatively support progress in the application of the Cartagena Action Plan. The 11MSP encouraged the Coordinating Committee to consider similar efforts in 2012. Pursuant to this, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance convened two sessions to discuss in more detail the challenges faced by two States Parties in implementing the plans and fulfilling the commitments made in their Article 5 extension requests; the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance convened two sessions to discuss in more detail the experiences of two States Parties in applying the victim assistance aspects of the Cartagena Action Plan; and, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance convened one session to discuss

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<sup>38</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #66.

the idea of establishing a platform for partnerships to better enable States Parties to exchange information on available assistance, particularly non-financial assistance.

133. In assessing the efforts of Co-Chairs in 2012 to explore different ways of using the Intersessional Work Programme to more intensively focus on national contexts or to otherwise creatively support progress in the application of the Cartagena Action Plan, the Coordinating Committee noted that participants who provided feedback expressed mixed views, with both benefits to the format (e.g., greater scope for informal participation, more interactivity) and drawbacks (e.g., parallel sessions pose difficulties for small delegations, lack of translation) mentioned. It was noted that the feedback provided would be useful for the Coordinating Committee in 2013 to determine whether small group discussions should again be used.
134. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed to support the efforts of the President and Coordinating Committee to ensure effective preparations and conduct of meetings of the Convention.<sup>39</sup> Since the 11MSP, the Coordinating Committee met INSERT NUMBER times to fulfil its mandate to coordinate matters relating to and flowing from the work of the Standing Committees with the work of the 12MSP.
135. At the Cartagena Summit, the States Parties agreed that those in a position to do so would contribute to the Sponsorship Programme thereby permitting widespread representation at meetings of the Convention, particularly by mine-affected developing States Parties.<sup>40</sup> In 2012, the following States Parties contributed to the Sponsorship Programme: Australia, Denmark and Norway. At the May 2012 meetings of the Standing Committees, 44 representatives of 28 States Parties were sponsored as was 1 representative of 1 State not party. At the 12MSP, [INSERT NUMBER] representatives of [INSERT NUMBER] States Parties were sponsored as were [INSERT NUMBER] representatives of [INSERT NUMBER] States not parties. In 2012, the Sponsorship Programme again helped enable States Parties live up to the commitment they made at the Cartagena Summit to ensure the ensure the continued involvement and effective contribution in all relevant Convention related activities by health, rehabilitation, social services, education, employment, gender and disability rights experts.
136. Since the 10MSP, the States Parties, in keeping with their Cartagena Summit commitment, continued to recognise and further encourage the full participation in and contribution to the implementation of the Convention by the ICBL, ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, the UN, the GICHD, international and regional organisations, mine survivors and their organisations, and other civil society organisations.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #63.

<sup>40</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #67.

<sup>41</sup> Cartagena Action Plan, Action #64.

**Annex I****Stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported as of 31 December 2011</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed in 2012</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines remaining</i>
Belarus <sup>42</sup>	3,356,636	0	3,356,636
Greece <sup>43</sup>	953,285	0	953,285
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia <sup>44</sup>	1,248	1,248	0
Ukraine <sup>45</sup>	5,939,905	6,720	5,933,185
<b>Totals</b>	<b>10,251,074</b>	<b>7,968</b>	<b>10,243,106</b>

  

<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties as of 31 December 2011</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties since 1 January 2012</i>	<i>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines reported destroyed by all States Parties as of 7 December 2012</i>
44,535,121	7,968	44,543,089

42 Source: statement delivered by Belarus at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 21 May 2012.

43 Source: statement delivered by Greece during the 11th Meeting of the States Parties on 1 December 2011.

44 Article 7 report, 1 January 2011 to 20 May 2012.

45 Sources: Article 7 report 1 January to 31 December 2011 and statement delivered by Ukraine at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 21 May 2012.

## Annex II

**Mines reported retained since the First Review Conference for purposes permitted under Article 3 of the Convention**

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Afghanistan <sup>46</sup>	1076	1887	2692	2680	2618	2618		0
Albania	0		0	0	0	0		0
Algeria	15030	15030	15030	15030	6000	5970		5970
Andorra	0	0	0		0			
Angola	1390	1460	2512			2512		1439
Antigua and Barbuda								
Argentina <sup>47</sup>	1680	1596	1471	1380	1268	1142	1046	867
Australia	7395	7266	7133	6998	6785	6947	6927	6788
Austria	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahamas	0				0			
Bangladesh	15000	14999	12500	12500	12500	12500		12500
Barbados								
Belarus	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030	6030	6022
Belgium	4176	3820	3569	3287	3245	3204	3100	3041
Belize								0
Benin		30	16	16				
Bhutan			4491					
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0							
Bosnia and Herzegovina <sup>48</sup>	2755	17471	1708	1920	2390	2255	1985	1624
Botswana <sup>49</sup>								
Brazil <sup>50</sup>	16125	15038	13550	12381	10986	10051	8976	7913
Brunei Darussalam <sup>51</sup>			0			0		
Bulgaria	3676	3676	3670	3682	3682	3672	3672	3672
Burkina Faso <sup>52</sup>								
Burundi				4	4	4	4	4
Cambodia <sup>53</sup>	596	125	125	594	519	701	845	1118
Cameroon <sup>54</sup>	3154				1885			

46 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2012, Afghanistan indicated that the detention of live mines for its training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques was not required. All mine bodies used in training programmes have had their fuses removed and destroyed.

47 In its report submitted in 2002, Argentina indicated that 1160 mines were retained to be used as fuses for antitank mines FMK-5 and that 1000 will be consumed during training activities until 1 April 2010. Additionally, in Form F, Argentina indicated that 12025 mines would be emptied of their explosive content in order to have inert mines for training.

48 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2010, BiH indicated that 2,255 mines were without fuses.

49 In its report submitted in 2001, Botswana indicated that a "small quantity" of mines would be retained.

50 In its reports submitted in 2006 and 2009, Brazil indicated that it intends to keep its Article 3 mines up to 2019.

51 In its report submitted in 2007, Brunei Darussalam indicated that there were no live anti-personnel mines prohibited by the Convention retained for the development and training in Brunei Darussalam. For these purposes, the Royal Brunei Armed Forces is using anti-personnel mines that are not prohibited by the Convention.

52 In its reports submitted in 2005, 2007 and 2008, Burkina Faso indicated that "nothing yet" was retained.

53 In a statement delivered during the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention on 25 May 2012, Cambodia indicated that the 1,118 mines retained by Cambodia under Article 3 are not live mines.

54 In its report submitted in 2009, Cameroon indicated in Form B that 1,885 mines were held and in Form D that some thousands of mines were held for training purposes.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Canada <sup>55</sup>	1907	1992	1963	1963	1939	1937	1921	1921
Cape Verde					120			
Central African Republic								
Chad	0	0	0		0	0		
Chile	5895	4574	4484	4153	4083	3346		3228
Colombia	886	886	586	586	586	586	586	586
Comoros								
Congo	372	372	372		322			
Cook Islands			0					
Costa Rica	0					0		
Côte d'Ivoire	0	0	0		0	0		
Croatia	6400	6236	6179	6103	6038	5954	5848	5775
Cyprus	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	500	500	500
Czech Republic	4829	4829	4699	4699	2543	2497	2473	2443
Democratic Republic of the Congo <sup>56</sup>								5
Denmark	1989	60	2008	2008	1990	1950	1893	1879
Djibouti	2996							
Dominica	0							
Dominican Republic					0			
Ecuador	2001	2001	2001	1000	1000	1000	910	905
El Salvador	96	72			0			0
Equatorial Guinea								
Eritrea <sup>57</sup>	9		109	109	109	172	172	101
Estonia	0		0	0	0	0		
Ethiopia				1114	303	303	303	
Fiji								
France	4455	4216	4170	4152	4144	4017	4017	3941
Gabon								
Gambia					0	100		100
Germany	2496	2525	2526	2388	2437	2261	2201	2130
Ghana								
Greece	7224	7224	7224	7224	7224	6158	6158	6158
Grenada								
Guatemala	0				0	0	0	0
Guinea								
Guinea-Bissau <sup>58</sup>		109		109	9	9	9	
Guyana		0				0		

55 84 of the 1941 mines reported in 2007 are without fuses.

56 In its reports submitted in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that the decision concerning mines retained was pending. In its report submitted in 2012, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that 3 antipersonnel mines were found in Bangboka/Kisangani and 2 antipersonnel mines were found in Muanda. The fuses were removed and the mines were kept for training purposes.

57 In its report submitted in 2005, Eritrea indicated that the mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2007, Eritrea indicated that 9 of the 109 mines retained were inert. In its report submitted in 2008, Eritrea indicated that 8 of the 109 retained mines were inert. In its report submitted in 2010, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 172 mines retained for training were inert. At the 25 May 2012 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Eritrea indicated that it currently retained 101 mines, 30 of which were live.

58 In its reports submitted in 2006 and 2008, Guinea Bissau indicated that amongst the 109 retained mines, 50 POM22 and 50 PMD6 did not contain detonators or explosive. In its report submitted in 2009, Guinea Bissau indicated that the 50 POM22 were transferred for metal use and the 50 PMD6 were eliminated and used as wood.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Haiti					0			
Holy See	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
Honduras		815	826					
Hungary	1500		0		0	0		0
Iceland	0	0	0	0				
Indonesia				4978	4978	2454	2454	2454
Iraq				9	TBC	698	1441	
Ireland	85	77	75	70	67	66	64	62
Italy	806	806	750	721	689	674	669	643
Jamaica	0		0					
Japan	6946	5350	4277	3712	3320	2976	2673	2419
Jordan	1000	1000	1000	950	950	900	850	900
Kenya		3000		3000				
Kiribati								
Kuwait				0	0	0		
Latvia		1301	902	899	899	118	0	0
Lesotho								
Liberia								
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	1563	1488
Luxembourg	956	956	900	855		800	599	0
Madagascar								
Malawi	21				0	0		
Malaysia	0				0	0	0	0
Maldives		0						
Mali	600							
Malta	0	0		0	0			
Mauritania	728	728	728	728	728	728	728	728
Mauritius	0	0	0	0				0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Monaco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montenegro			0	0	0	0	0	
Mozambique <sup>59</sup>	1470	1319	1265		1963	1943	1935	1683
Namibia	6151	3899			1734	1634		
Nauru								
Netherlands	3176	2878	2735	2516	2413	2214	2021	1830
New Zealand <sup>60</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nicaragua	1040	1021	1004	1004	1004	963	448	
Niger	146	146			146			
Nigeria	0	0			3364	3364		3364
Niue								
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Palau				0	0		0	0
Panama					0			

59 In its report submitted in 2009, Mozambique indicated that 520 of the retained mines were inherited from an NPA mine detection training camp. This camp is not used as training falls outside of the IND scope of work so the mines will be destroyed in June 2009. In its report submitted in 2012, Mozambique reported that 98 of the 1683 mines retained under Article 3 were inert.

60 In its report submitted in 2007, New Zealand indicated that it retains operational stocks of M18A1 Claymores which are operated in the command-detonated mode only. Other than the M18A1 Claymores, the New Zealand Defence Force holds a very limited quantity of inert practice mines, used solely in the training of personnel in mine clearance operations, in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Papua New Guinea <sup>61</sup>								
Paraguay		0	0			0		
Peru	4024	4012	4012	4000	4047	2060	2040	2040
Philippines	0	0	0			0		
Portugal	1115	1115	1115		760	697	694	694
Qatar								
Romania	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500	2500
Republic of Moldova	249	249	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	101	101		65				
Saint Kitts and Nevis								
Saint Lucia								
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								
Samoa			0					
San Marino	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe				0				
Senegal <sup>62</sup>	0		24	24	28	28	28	37
Serbia <sup>63</sup>	5000	5507		5565	3589	3159	3159	3149
Seychelles	0							
Sierra Leone								
Slovakia	1427	1427	1427	1422	1422	1422	1372	1272
Slovenia	2994	2993	2993	2992	2991		2978	
Solomon Islands								
South Africa	4388	4433	4406	4380	4356	4356	4355	
Spain	2712	2712	2034	1994	1797	1735	1729	1718
Sudan	5000	10000	10000	4997	1938	1938	1938	1938
Suriname	150	150	150	0				
Swaziland		0						
Sweden <sup>64</sup>	14798	14402	10578	7531	7364	7364	7150	6954
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	255	225	105	0	0	0	0	
Thailand <sup>65</sup>	4970	4761	4713	3650	3638	3626	3466	3374
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	4000	0	0	0	0		0	0
Timor-Leste								
Togo								

61 In its report submitted in 2004, Papua New Guinea indicated that it had a small stock of command-detonated Claymore mines for training purposes only by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

62 In its reports submitted in 2007 and 2008, Senegal indicated that the 24 mines it retains under Article 3 were found during demining operations or in rebels stocks held before they were destroyed in August-September 2006. These mines have been defused and are used to train deminers. In its report submitted in 2010, Senegal indicated that 4 of the mines retained for training had been defused. In its report submitted in 2012, Senegal indicated that 13 of the 37 mines retained under Article 3 have been defused.

63 In its report submitted in 2009, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 510 PMA-1 type and 560 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. In its report submitted in 2012, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 500 PMA-1 type and 545 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed.

64 In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, Sweden indicated that 2840 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its report submitted in 2009, Sweden indicated that 2780 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies. In its report submitted in 2012, Sweden indicated that 2,750 mines were without fuses and could be connected to fuses kept for dummies.

65 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2010, Thailand reported the transfer of all its mines for training and destruction.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Trinidad and Tobago		0			0	0	0	0
Tunisia	5000	5000	5000	4995	4980	4980	4910	4890
Turkey	16000	15150	15150	15150	15125	15100	15100	15100
Turkmenistan	0	0				0		
Ukraine		1950	1950	223	211	187	0	0
Uganda	1764			1764	1764	1764		1764
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1937	1795	650	609	903	833	673	311
United Republic of Tanzania	1146	1146	1102	950	1780			
Ukraine	N/A	1950	1950	223	211	187	170	0
Uruguay				260				
Vanuatu		0		0				
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4960	4960	4960	4960	4960	4960	4874	4874
Yemen	4000	4000				3760	4000	3760
Zambia	3346	3346	3346	2232	2120	2120	2120	2120
Zimbabwe <sup>66</sup>	700	700	700	600	550		550	500

<sup>66</sup> In its report submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported 700 mines retained for training in Form D and indicated that 100 had been destroyed during training in 2007 in Form B.

**Annex III****States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5: financial value of assistance obtained and national resources made available**

	Assistance obtained		National resources	
	2011	2012	2011	2012
Afghanistan				
Angola				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				
Burundi				
Cambodia				
Chad				
Colombia				
Congo				
Croatia				
DRC				
Ecuador				
Eritrea				
Ethiopia				
Gambia				
Iraq				
Mauritania				
Mozambique				
Niger				
Peru				
Senegal				
Serbia				
South Sudan				
Sudan				
Tajikistan				
Thailand				
Uganda				
Yemen				
Zimbabwe				

**Annex IV****Legal measures taken in accordance with Article 9****(a) States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of article 9 obligations**


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Albania	Australia	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Belize
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Brazil	Burkina Faso
Burundi	Cambodia	Canada
Chad	Colombia	Cook Islands
Costa Rica	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Djibouti
El Salvador	France	Germany
Guatemala	Honduras	Hungary
Iceland	Ireland	Italy
Japan	Jordan	Kiribati
Latvia	Liechtenstein	Luxembourg
Malaysia	Mali	Malta
Mauritania	Mauritius	Monaco
New Zealand	Nicaragua	Niger
Norway	Panama	Peru
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Senegal	Serbia
Seychelles	South Africa	Spain
Sweden	Switzerland	Timor Leste
Trinidad and Tobago	Turkey	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe

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**(b) States Parties that have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligations**

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Algeria	Andorra
Argentina	Bulgaria
Central African Republic	Chile
Denmark	Estonia
Ethiopia	Greece
Guinea-Bissau	Holy See
Indonesia	Kuwait
Lesotho	Lithuania
Mexico	Montenegro
Mozambique	Namibia
Netherlands	Papua New Guinea
Portugal	Qatar
Republic of Moldova	Romania
Samoa	Slovakia
Slovenia	Tajikistan
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Tunisia
Ukraine	United Republic of Tanzania
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	

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**(c) States Parties that have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they consider existing laws to be sufficient**

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Afghanistan	Angola	Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas	Bangladesh	Barbados
Benin	Bhutan	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Botswana	Brunei Darussalam	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Comoros	Congo
Côte d'Ivoire	Dominica	Dominican Republic
Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea
Fiji	Gabon	Gambia
Ghana	Grenada	Guinea
Guyana	Haiti	Iraq
Jamaica	Kenya	Liberia
Madagascar	Malawi	Maldives
Nauru	Nigeria	Niue
Palau	Paraguay	Philippines
Rwanda	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Saint Lucia
San Marino	Sao Tome and Principe	Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands	South Sudan	Sudan
Suriname	Swaziland	Thailand
Togo	Turkmenistan	Tuvalu
Uganda	Uruguay	Vanuatu